merely reinforce obligations we would have anyway, and many moral truths are entirely independent of God's will or commands. Philip Quinn4 has presented a theory according to which "divine commands, were they to be issued, would suffice to impose indefeasible requirements." But Quinn's theory does not include the claim that God has issued any commands, and it leaves open the possibility that any requirement imposed by a command of God is also imposed by something else. None of these proposals, then, includes a leading feature of the traditional divine command theory, which is that all of our obligations are due to God's commands. In this paper I shall describe a divine command theory which incorporates this feature, but which is n6t definist, and I shall try to show how this theory can be defended against a number of recent and traditional objections.
I
According to the view I want to present, there are moral properties such as being obligatory and being wrong, and there are what might be called "theological properties," such as, being commanded by God and being forbidden by God. But it is not true that properties of the first kind can be identified with properties of the second kind. Furthermore, it is not true that predicates expressing moral properties can be defined in terms of predicates expressing theological properties. According to this view, however, if an act possesses a moral property , it does so in virtue of possessing some theological property. For example, if an act is obligatory, then it has the property of being obligatory in virtue of having the further property of being commanded by God; and if an act is wrong, then it has the property of being wrong in virtue of having the further property of being forbidden by God. More precisely, the theory includes the following principles:
(P1) For all acts a, a is obligatory iffGod commands a; and if a is obligatory then by commanding a God makes it the case that a is obligatory.
(P2) For all acts a, a is wrong iff God forbids a; and if a is wrong then by forbidding a God makes it the case that a is wrong.
The left conjuncts of these principles assert the coextension of what is
obligatory and what is wrong with God's commands and prohibitions, respectively. The right conjuncts are intended to express the stronger condition that the possession of these moral properties is in some sense about the nature of this relation. Nevertheless, I am sure that there are such relations, and (P1)-(P3), as well as other things to be said below, can be taken to place constraints on the interpretation of the theory's primitive locution. I should also note that although I speak of God's commands and prohibitions and I call the theory a divine command theory, this is really a convenient shorthand and a courtesy to tradition. I think that the theory is best formulated in terms of God's will and wants or His approval and disapproval. Thus, what makes an act obligatory is that God wants it to be performed. As a matter of fact, God's commands might always be general and never commands that some particular act be done; so they might not generate many obligations. Divine commands could, nevertheless, be extremely important for the divine command theorist, for perhaps it is through general commands that God reveals His wishes with respect to particular acts. Distinguishing between God's explicit commands and His will allows a resolution of the difficult problem of Abraham and Isaac. Presumably God prohibits the killing of innocent children. Yet Isaac was an innocent child whom, according to the biblical account, God commanded Abraham to kill.5 Must the divine command theorist conclude that it was both obligatory and wrong that Abraham kill Isaac? I suggest that the divine command theorist not take God Objection III. The objector might regard this response as grounds for another objection: if what is right or wrong can be recognized independently of knowing anything of God's commands, the divine command theory is irrelevant. We should concentrate on finding which acts have the properties of being right or wrong, however that might be done, and not worry about trying to discover God's commands. There are two things that can be said in reply. First, there is clearly a place for a theory of morality which is of theoretical interest, and not, primarily, of practical interest. It would be theoretically interesting to learn that what makes acts obligatory is that they are commanded by God, regardless of the practical difficulties in discovering God's commands, just as it would be of theoretical interest to learn that utilitarianism is correct, regardless of the practical difficulty of calculating the values of the consequences of all of our alternative actions (See [7] : 40f.). Second, the divine command theorist need not be so pessimistic about the practical relevance of God's commands. The divine command theorist presumably believes that God has revealed certain of His commands. The divine command theorist might also believe that, at least in some cases, it is less difficult to discern God's commands than to detect whether an act has a certain moral property. Hence, if this is correct, the theory might even have some practical value.
Objection IV. Some philosophers apparently believe that the divine command theory violates the Humean dictum: "No Ought from an Is." In discussing the claim "that certain religious beliefs entail certain ethical beliefs, and that the latter can be logically inferred from the former," William Frankena appeals to Hume's slogan and remarks that properly construed, it is a perfectly correct dictum. By the ordinary canons of logic a conclusion containing the term 'ought' or 'right' cannot be logically derived from premisses which do not contain this term, except in such cases as "It is raining, therefore either it is raining or we ought to be kind to animals," which can hardly afford aid and comfort to theologiains who [claim to derive ethical conclusions from theological premisses] or even to those who advocate kindness to animals. ( [9] : 300) Let us say that an argument isformally valid just in case its corresponding conditional is an instance of a theorem of the predicate calculus, and let us say, less precisely, that an ethical claim is interesting just in case it is not one like the claim that it is raining or we ought to be kind to animals. If we suppose that there is a clear distinction between purely factual statements and ethical or evaluative ones, then we can say that a formulation of Hume's dictum suggested by Frankena's remarks is the claim that no formally valid argument whose premisses are jointly consistent and purely factual has an interesting ethical conclusion. So construed, Hume's dictum does seem to be supported by the "ordinary canons of logic," but is the divine command theory incompatible with this claim? Is there according to the divine command theory, a formally valid argument which has consistent factual premisses and an interesting ethical conclusion? I do not think so, since in order to construct a formally valid argument from the factual premiss (5) God forbids Neil's gratuitously pummeling Carl, for example, we would need some evaluative premiss like (6) Whatever God forbids is wrong in order to derive an interesting ethical conclusion like (7) Neil's gratuitously pummeling Carl is wrong.
Thus, I do not think that the divine command theory is incompatible with this formulation of Hume's dictum.
There is another version of Hume's dictum suggested by Frankena's remarks, however, with which the divine command theory might be incompatible. In the passage cited, Frankena was discussing the view "that certain religious beliefs entail certain ethical beliefs," and he claimed that Hume's dictum might be inconsistent with that view. If we agree that one proposition entails another just in case it is not possible that the first is true while the second is false, then it might well be that a set of theological propositions entails an ethical conclusion without there being a formally valid argument with the theological propositions as premisses and the ethical proposition as conclusion. Perhaps we should consider, then, the following stronger formulation of Hume's dictum: No consistent set of factual premisses entails a contingent, interesting ethical conclusion. Is the divine command theory inconsistent with this principle? The answer depends on which version of the divine command theory is intended. Consider again (5) God forbids Neil's gratuitously pummeling Carl.
According to the contingent divine command theory, (5) does not entail (7) Neil's gratuitously pummeling Carl is wrong.
On this version of the theory, the conjunction of (5) with a contingent proposition such as (6) Whatever God forbids is wrong entails (7), but (5) alone does not entail (7). So the contingent version of the divine command theory does not seem to be inconsistent with this formulation of Hume's dictum. 
And he apparently holds (12) If a being is good, then there is a reason to praise that being.
Clearly, both the conjunction of (8), (10), and (12) and the conjunction of (9), (11), and (12) entail (13) It is not the case that God is good.
Thus, it is perhaps by one of these arguments that Leibniz attempts to support his charge that the divine command theory "deprives God of the designation good." What response can be made to these arguments? The defender of the strong version of the divine command theory certainly seems to be committed to (8) and (9), so it would be futile to deny them. And (12) seems beyond reproach. But why accept (10) appeal to an independent standard of right and wrong in deciding what commands to make. Hence, God's commands would seem to be arbitrary, and, thus, according to Leibniz, they provide no basis for ascribing goodness to God. Indeed, this objection can be strengthened by posing it in the form of a dilemma. Either God's commands are arbitrary, or they are not. If they are, then God merits no praise either for issuing them or for acting in accord with them. If, on the other hand, God's commands are not arbitrary, then He must have reasons for them; but then the moral status of acts would seem to derive from these reasons, rather than from God's commands." I believe that the divine command theorist can make a plausible response to this objection. According to the divine command theory there is no independent standard of morality to which God's commands conform. In that sense, then, God's commands are arbitrary. But the divine command theorist need not think that God's commands are utterly arbitrary; as we saw above, a divine command theorist might well believe that some features of God's character, for example, that He is essentially loving, place constraints on what He commands. Other such features might include being faithful, being kind, and being merciful. These attributes are such that possessing them tends to coincide with acting in conformity to God's commands. To the extent that this is true, God is praiseworthy because of His commands: they are commands that "comport well" with the mentioned attributes. Nevertheless, it might be that God's possessing these attributes of being loving, faithful, etc., is what provides the primary reason for ascribing goodness to Him. Moreover, the divine command theorist might well value these attributes independently of God's commands. This would allow an account of how by ascribing goodness to God a divine command theorist not only describes God, as having various character traits, but also, typically, expresses approval-the traits in question are ones which the divine command theorist values. So although the divine command theorist holds that God's commands do not conform to an independent moral law, it does not seem to me that the divine command theorist is thereby prevented from ascribing goodness to God.
Objection VI. A final objection has not, as far as I know, actually been made against the divine command theory, but is a natural application of recent work on the formulation of act-utilitarianism. According to Lennart Aqvist, the moral status of an act may change over time ( [2] ). It might be alleged, however, that there is no way to incorporate this feature into our version of the divine command theory. God, after all, is immutable, or so it is often thought, and His commands and prohibitions must remain constant. Hence, according to our theory, the moral status of acts, which is dependent upon those commands and prohibitions, must also remain constant. And (17), it might be alleged, entails (15). However, Feldman's example can equally well be taken to show that (17) does not entail (15) and that (15) is false. Presumably it was true all along that the doctor would give medicine B at tj, and, in particular, this was true at to. But if it was true at to that the doctor would give medicine B at t1, then it was also true at to that it would be wrong to give medicine A at t2. At to we might be ignorant of the doctor's impending poor choice at t1; hence we might be justified at to in believing that medicine B would be wrong at t2. God, on the other hand, being omniscient, would always have known that medicine B would be administered on the first day of treatment. Hence, He would have been careful to command that B also be given on the second day. Thus, this case does not clearly show that the moral status of an act can change over time.
It might be objected that this way of viewing the doctor's dilemma requires that we say, counterintuitively, that it was a good thing that the doctor did not perform all his obligations. Is (24) true in this case, and does it entail (15)? Before we can answer these questions we need to look more closely at (24). As our divine command theory has been developed, moral properties apply, in the first instance, to particular acts. In a derivative way they may also apply to types of acts. But we have not yet seen how moral properties apply to a course of action. Perhaps we can begin to extend the theory as follows. First, let us say that a course of action is a sequence, (a, ... , an), of agent-identical acts such that for each ai and aj, if i<j then the time of a is no later than the time of aj. One condition that seems to be necessary for a sequence being right is that it be, in some sense, within the power of its agent. Not every member of a right sequence, however, actually has to be within the power of its agent. It could happen that in carrying out the sequence the agent would do things that bring subsequent members of the sequence within his or her power. Thus, it seems to be sufficient that each member of a right sequence is such that it would, at its time, be within the power of its agent, were all temporally prior members to have been performed. Analogously, not every member of a right sequence actually has to be right. Perhaps it is sufficient that each member is such that it would be right, were all temporally prior members to have been performed. If this is correct, however, it is clear that (24) does not entail (15 8Someone who holds that lying is wrong might want to say that the act-type lying is wrong. But (P5) does not allow us to say this, since some instances of lying are not wrong. Perhaps, however, the claim that lying is wrong should be taken as a summary of past moral experience. Then we might prefer to say that the act-type lying is wrong if most instances of lying are wrong, or if most situations in which an instance of lying is an option are situations in which that instance is wrong. I shall not attempt to introduce this sense of 'wrong' into our theory.
9Rather than holding that God is essentially loving, Robert Adams suggests that an ethical statement of a believer "presupposes that certain conditions for the applicability of the believer's concepts of ethical right and wrong are satisfied. Among these conditions is ... that God loves His human creatures" ([1]: 323). 0For this reference I am indebted to a referee for NOUS. 11This way of presenting Leibniz' objection was suggested by an editor of NOUS. The solution I recommend, which consists in admitting that God's commands are arbitrary, in the sense that there is no external standard of morality, but denying that this precludes ascribing goodness to God is inspired by Robert Adams' discussion in [ For all a, b, and t, if, at t, it is right to do a and to do b, then, at t, 
